Poverty Law -- Constitutional Law -- Selection of Sites for Public Housing by Beard, Hugh J., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 48 | Number 1 Article 20
12-1-1969
Poverty Law -- Constitutional Law -- Selection of
Sites for Public Housing
Hugh J. Beard Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hugh J. Beard Jr., Poverty Law -- Constitutional Law -- Selection of Sites for Public Housing, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 155 (1969).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol48/iss1/20
SITE SELECTION FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
Poverty Law-Constitutional Law-Selection of Sites
for Public Housing
Dorothy Gautreaux and other tenants in, and applicants for, public
housing in Chicago filed suit against the Chicago Housing Authority
and its executive directors' for alleged violation of their rights under
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and section
2000d of title 42, United States Code.' Their case was based on two
theories. First, the plaintiffs alleged an intentional violation of the
fourteenth amendment and section 2000d by the housing authority
through (1) discriminatory tenant assignment procedures within the
public housing system and (2) discriminatory selection of sites for
public housing projects, both designed to maintain existing patterns of
residential separation of the races. The second theory alleged that the
housing authority, regardless of its intentions, violated plaintiffs' rights
under the fourteenth amendment and section 2000d by failing to alleviate
residential racial segregation in site selection procedures.'
On March 2, 1967, the court, holding that an affirmative intent to
segregate is necessary to state a cause of action for violation of rights
under the fourteenth amendment and section 2000d, dismissed the
counts concerning the unintentional violation of plaintiffs' rights.4 But
the court noted that if intent to segregate be proved the selection of
sites in Negro areas alone would violate plaintiffs' rights. "[P]laintiffs,
as present and future users of the system, have the right under the Four-
teenth Amendment to have sites selected for public housing projects with-
out regard to the racial composition of either the surrounding neighbor-
hood or of the projects themselves."' Based upon depositions and affi-
davits submitted by both sides, the court, finding an intent by defendants
to segregate by race, on February 10, 1969, granted summary judgment
for plaintiffs. The court held that the housing authority had violated the
plaintiffs' rights not only in discriminatory tenant assignment procedures
but also in discriminatory selection of project sites.' The court's decree,
7
'Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
242 U.S.C. §2000d (1964): "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
' Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
RId. at 583.
'Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
'Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 1969).
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issued on July 1, 1969, ordered the housing authority (1) to cease all dis-
criminatory selection of project sites and (2) to disestablish the segregated
public housing system by dispersing all future public housing through-
out the city.
Tenant assignment procedures in public housing, by which Negro
and white applicants were placed in different projects by race, were one
of the main targets of the civil rights movement8 even before Brown v.
Board of Education,' and were among the first segregation schemes
prohibited upon its authority. In Detroit Housing Authority v. Lewis,' °
a leading case decided upon the assignment issue, Negroes had been
excluded from certain public housing because of race. They sued the
housing authority to enjoin the continuation of racially separate hous-
ing." The court, extensively citing Brown, ordered that housing units
be assigned without regard to race.
In Gautreau, the housing authority maintained four housing projects
in white neighborhoods in which the tenants were overwhelmingly white.
Its fifty other projects were located in Negro areas and the tenants were
ninety-nine per cent black."2 Despite a ninety per cent Negro waiting
list for all projects, this racial pattern was established and maintained
first by exclusion of, then by a fixed quota for, Negro families in the
predominantly white projects; by secret listing of the projects as suitable
for white families only; and by discouraging Negroes from expressing
an interest in these projects. 13 These facts having been proved, the court
had little difficulty in applying the holding in Detroit Housing Authority
v. Lewis 4 to order an end to further discrimination in tenant assign-
ment procedures.'5
Before Gautreaux, the only case that seems to have directly been
concerned with the use of site selection to promote segregation was
Thompson v. Housing Authority.'8  The court in Gautreau% cited
'See Vann v. Toledo Metro. Housing Auth., 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ohio
1953); Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
9347 U.S. 483 (1954)." 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
" Detroit Housing Auth. v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180, 181-82 n.2 (6th Cir. 1955).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 910-11 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
"' Initial Brief for Plaintiffs at 24, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
1,226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. i955).
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill.
1969)." 251 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
[Vol. 48
SITE SELECTION FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
it when dismissing plaintiffs' allegations of unintentional violation
of their rights?' The selection of sites in Negro areas was alleged in
Thompson to have diverted eligible low-income white families from
the public housing system, thereby furthering segregation. But the court
in Thompson dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs to allege
the necessary intent to segregate, and it also questioned whether the
selection of Negro sites had in fact caused the low number of white ap-
plicants."8 Other than mentioning Thompson, which hardly supports
its position, the court in Gautreaux gave no authority for holding that
public housing sites must be selected without regard to the racial com-
position of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the projects them-
selves,' 9 and that there is an affirmative duty to integrate by placing the
projects in white neighborhoods.
The method of site selection used by the Chicago Housing Au-
thority was prescribed by law20 and provided for a canvass of the city
for future sites, which would be chosen upon considerations of cost,
slum clearance, accessibility, surrounding land uses, and municipal
planning.2 Proposed plans for projects for these sites were then de-
veloped and submitted to the city council for approval. Following such
approval, the housing authority would acquire the land and lease the
units, usually with considerable financial aid from the federal govern-
ment.2 2 The intent to discriminate and to segregate was alleged to lie
primarily with the city council, with which the housing authority had
collaborated and acquiesced by informal presubmission of each site to the
alderman in whose constituency the proposed site was located2 and by
the formal submission of proposed sites surviving this veto to the full
council to permit further weeding out of sites in white areas without
endangering the maximum utilization of Chicago's federal housing
aid.24
The court found that this method of site selection, in both its formal
' Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill.
1967).Thompson v. Housing Auth., 251 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D. Fla. 1966).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
2' ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 67Y, §§ 8.1-.3, 8.9-.11, 9 (1955).
"Initial Brief for Defendants at 9, 10, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth.,
296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 914-15 (N.D. Ill.1969).
19 initial Brief for Plaintiffs at 7-8, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
2" id. at 8-9.
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and informal aspects, was based upon racial considerations and in fact
was designed to perpetuate racial residential segregation. 25 Moreover,
the court decided that the selection of sites for public housing projects
in wholly Negro areas discouraged large numbers of eligible low-income
white families from applying for public housing." The final decree
seems to have been aimed not only at correcting this tendency toward
racial segregation in the public housing system but also at instituting an
affirmative duty to integrate. The court ordered that, with certain ex-
ceptions, the next seven hundred units built, and seventy-five per cent of
all units acquired by whatever means thereafter, be located in white
areas, defined as United States census tracts having less than thirty
per cent non-white residents.2
Further the court ordered that,
"[n]o Dwelling Units shall be located in any census tract if, following
such location, the aggregate number of apartments and single family
residences theretofore made available to low-income, non-elderly fam-
ilies, directly or indirectly by or through CHA [Chicago Housing Au-
thority], in such census tract would constitute more than 15% of the
total number of apartments and single family residences in such
census tract; ."28
To prevent the projects from becoming autonomous communities, the
court ordered that no project higher than three floors was to be built
for occupancy by families with children and no units over that height were
to be leased for such occupancy unless they were in structures in which
less than twenty per cent of the total units were leased by the housing
authority. An absolute maximum occupancy of 240 persons to each
project was established. 29 Finally, the court ordered that an extensive
publicity campaign be undertaken to inform eligible white families of the
,' The court found that only one out of fifty-one housing projects sites acquired
since 1955 had been in a white neighborhood, that several officials of the housing
.uthority believed that the city council was racially motivated, and that the hous-
ing authority gave no indication of the use of non-racial criteria in their decisions.
Upon these findings and upon the authority of Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24
(1967) and Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967), the court held that the city council acted with segrega-
tionist motives in which the housing authority participated. Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"' Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 915 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
2 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459, at 4 (N.D. Ill.
'July 1, 1969).
8d. at 6.
21 Id. at 5-6.
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new policies in site selection and tenant assignment to entice them into
the public housing system.30
Clearly, the court's decree goes farther than merely prohibiting
further acts of racial discrimination, or requiring the review of previous
discriminatory decisions upon relevant non-racial criteria such as ac-
cessibility, surrounding land uses, and cost. Instead, the court seems to
have held that not only site selection but also other relevant decisions,
such as project size, must be made for the purpose of alleviating resi-
dential separation by dispersing low income families of both races
throughout the city. Although the court provided neither authority nor
reasoning to justify either its holding that racial considerations in site
selection are unconstitutional or its decree ordering the elimination of
residential separation of the races through the dispersion of low-income
families in public housing, there are theories growing out of other
cases upon which the court's action in Gautreaux might be based.
In Brown v. Board of Education3 and other decisions involving
segregation in the public schools, the basic concepts of due process,
equal protection of the law, and the unequal nature of segregated
facilities were formulated. In them is to be found the original thinking
justifying the prohibition of racial segregation and a fundamental
dichotomy that greatly influences the analysis of the results of Gau-
treaux. The dichotomy is between the theory that there is an affirmative
duty to integrate and the concept that there is no such duty. 2
An affirmative duty to integrate means the duty to use both racial
and non-racial criteria for the purpose of eliminating racial imbalance,
commensurate with other acceptable goals. The absence of a duty to
integrate means that racial discrimination and segregation are constitu-
tionally prohibited and that only non-racial criteria may be used for the
purpose of achieving relevant goals, one of which need not, but may, be
the correction of racial imbalance. This dichotomy is the result of two
conflicting ways that Brown v. Board of Education"3 may be interpreted.
The interpretation that finds in Brown an affirmative duty to integrate
may be called the "sociological" view of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment while the "moral" view of the equal protec-
tion clause denies any affirmative duty to integrate.
34
30 Id. at 7.
,'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools? Some Judicial Responses and a
Statute, 46 B.U.L. Riv. 45 (1966).
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
,Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60.
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The "moral" view sees "[s]egregation with the sanction of law"'
rather than the separation of the races itself, as prohibited by the equal
protection clause. This concept of Brown is supported and clarified by
Bolling v. Sharpe,3" Brown's companion decision. Bolling, which in-
volved the public schools in the District of Columbia, could not be based
upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because
that provision is not specifically binding upon the federal government.
Therefore, the Supreme Court decided it upon the authority of the line
of anti-discrimination decisions based upon the concept that racial dis-
crimination by government involves the deprivation of personal rights
without due process of law. One case in this line, Buchanan v. Warley, 7
held that different treatment accorded to any group by the government
must be justified by a permissible governmental objective. Bolling
expanded this decision by holding that the separation of the races is
never a permissible governmental objective.8  This Buchanan-Bolling
rationale looks upon discriminatory intent of the government as the
crux of the matter, not the unequal social situation proscribed by the "so-
ciological" view.39
In Bell v. School City of Gary,4 ° the "moral" view is most clearly
expressed. 4' There considerable racial imbalance in the public schools
resulted from patterns of residential separation of the races.42 Plaintiffs
argued that this racial imbalance engendered the same inferior educa-
tion as legally imposed segregation. Finding that the acts and decisions
of the school officials were not racially motivated,4" the court held that
no state act had caused the imbalance or any resulting unequal educa-
tion and, therefore, no rights of the plaintiffs under the fourteenth
amendment had been violated. In other words, the court decided that
the correction of racial imbalance that is not the result of any state act
is not a constitutionally required goal of the public school system, and
there was no affirmative duty to integrate.44
Contrary to the "moral" view, the "sociological" view holds that
it is the provision of unequal educational opportunity resulting from
' Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
"'245 U.S. 60 (1916).
S347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
" Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60-61.
40 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
' Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60.
'2 Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209, 210-11 (7th Cir. 1963).
Is Id. at 213.
" Id.
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the separation of the races in schools that constitutes in itself unequal
protection of the laws. 45 Brown was decided within the context of the
separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Fergusson,46 which upheld racial
discrimination as permissible so long as equal services were provided for
all. In a long line of cases ending in Brown,4' this doctrine was modified
by the sociological concept of the inherently unequal nature of racially
separate education. Upon considerable sociological and psychological
evidence,4" the Supreme Court in Brown decided that separation of the
races in the public schools serves to deter the development of Negro
children. This "sociological" interpretation considers the unequal con-
dition of the Negro resulting from the separation of the races to be the
objectionable aspect of segregation in any government facility. 9
The "sociological" view of Brown was adopted by federal district
courts in Massachusetts and the District of Columbia in Barksdale v.
Springfield School Committee 0 and Hobsen v. Hansen.51 In Barks-
dale, a situation similar to that in Bell had developed. Considerable
racial imbalance in the schools, though not as pronounced as in Bell,
had prompted several Negroes to seek affirmative integration of the
system.52 The arguments were the same as those in Bell. In Hobsen,
the school system for the District of Columbia also maintained many
racially imbalanced schools" and had developed a track system whereby
college-bound students, who were predominantly white, were separated
early from the others and given special instruction." In both Barks-
dale and Hobsen, such racial imbalance, however caused, was held to
be a violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the fourteenth amendment,
even though no intent to segregate was proved, and the existing sys-
tem had never been structured with overt reference to race. The courts
ordered the respective school systems to correct the imbalance as much
"Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 61-64.
,163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'"McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 3,39 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Cannada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
,8 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
,Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra 32, at 61-64.
80237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st
Cir. 1965).
11269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
"Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543, 544-46 (D. Mass.
1965).
Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 410-12 (D.D.C. 1967).
8' Id. at 451-55.
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as possible, commensurate with other relevant educational goals." In
other words, the courts found an affirmative duty to integrate.
In Hobsen, the court ". . . draws the conclusion that the doctrine
of equal educational opportunity-the equal protection clause in its
application to public school education-is in its full sweep a component
of due process binding on the District under the due process clause
of the fifth amendment."56 This conclusion erased, in the court's view
at least, any distinction between the legal foundations of the decisions
in Brown and Bolling and thereby freed the courts in the District of
Columbia from any restrictions in applying the reasoning of the "so-
ciological" view of the equal protection clause to the federal govern-
ment.
In analyzing the three separate opinions by the court in Gautreaux,
it can be seen that this dichotomy pervades the court's reasoning. In the
1967 opinion,"7 in which the court first noticed the right to have sites
selected without regard to race, the court cited Bell v. School City of
Gary" ' and several other decisions expressing, in general, the "moral"
view of discrimination. It used these as authority for holding an af-
firmative intent to segregate a necessary allegation to state a cause of
action under either the fourteenth amendment or title 42 of section 2000d
of the United States Code."9 This view is not contradicted by the opinion
of February, 1969,60 finding the intent to segregate proven. At this
point, however, a consistent adherence to the "moral" view would have
required no more than ordering the housing authority to refrain from
further discrimination and possibly to review past decisions upon rele-
vant non-racial criteria.6 But the court's decree in July, 1969,02 or-
dered that future decisions on site selection and other matters be made
upon criteria designed to correct racial imbalance not only within
public housing but also within the residential areas of Chicago in gen-
eral.
The decree may be far more rationally based upon the "sociological"
"Id. at 514-17; Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 23'7 F. Supp. 543,
546-47 (D. Mass. 1965)."6 Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
" 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582, 584 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
" Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
"x See Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
"Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., Civil No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 1969).
[Vol. 48
SITE SELECTION FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
view of Brown than upon the "moral" view. In Brown, the Supreme
Court noted that enforced separation of the races itself caused a sense
of inferiority, a sense of being excluded from the rights enjoyed by
whites. 3 This sense of inferiority, the court continued, affects the moti-
vation for Negro children to learn and has a tendency to retard their
educational and mental development. 4 A sense of inferiority that results
from racial segregation six hours a day in the public schools could not
differ greatly from the feeling of inferiority which would develop from-
indeed, which would be nourished by-segregation twenty-four hours
each day in public housing." A child will not notice that no law requires
either sort of separation. The sense of exclusion would remain though
it be proclaimed that both schools and neighborhood were open to
whites.60 That there is a sense of inferiority induced by racial separation
is confirmed by the stigma attached by both communities to any school,
public facility, or neighborhood utilized or frequented almost solely
by Negroes."' Another result of separation of Negroes from whites is
that, inasmuch as the white culture is the dominant one, the Negro is
thereby excluded from contact with the culture within which he must
live.0 8 A Negro raised in a racially imbalanced neighborhood is cut off
from most forms of white culture. Not only is his school overwhelm-
ingly Negro, but also all the other contacts in his life. He is made un-
able to cope with the dominant culture, to meet or even to understand
its standards."9 Two cultures come to exist, black and white, between
which barriers are perpetuated by stereotypes, misunderstandings, ha-
treds, and an intensified inability to communicate.
The above reasoning supports a court's decreeing that housing de-
cisions be directed toward the goal of residential integration. Consistent
with this reasoning, the decree in Gautreaux goes farther than mere
correction of the imbalance caused by the selection of wholly Negro sites
for public housing projects, by establishing standards for maximum
occupancy, height, and density of public housing units. Dispersion of
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
Id.; Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 420-21 (D.D.C. 1967); Note,
Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 60-61.
" Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobsen v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 508 (D.D.C. 1967).
" Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 504 n.189 (D.D.C. 1967).
' Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 495, 497, 501 (D.D.C. 1967).
8 Note, Duty to Integrate Public Schools?, supra notes 32. at 46-47, 62-63.
"Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 505 (D.D.C. 1967); Note, Duty to
Integrate Public Schools?, supra note 32, at 47.
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public housing tenants does not so much cause white families to take
public housing as it puts the tenants in contact with white non-tenants,
thereby acting broadly to correct the evils of residential separation of the
races. The change in the basis of the court's reasoning between the
first opinion in March, 1967, and the issuance of the decree in July,
1969, may indicate a change in constitutional theories upon the part
of the court; but it does not leave the final decree without sufficient
justification. Thus Gautreaux raises for the first time the question of
whether racial imbalance in public housing is a denial of equal protection
of the laws,7" which the Constitution would require government to seek
to correct.
HUGH J. BEARD, JR.
Poverty Law-Garnishment-Protection of Debtors' Rights
Garnishment' is a remedy of ancient origin and doubtless has served
the interests of justice. But as wages have become the predominant
form of individual income, a once-valuable remedy has changed into an
instrument that too often shelters the unjust and defrauds the unfor-
tunate.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,2 the United States Supreme
Court attempted to eliminate some of the injustices of garnishment. The
Family Finance Corporation had initiated a garnishment proceeding
against Mrs. Sniadach, and against her employer as garnishee. Defendant
was served with summons and complaint the same day that her employer
was served with process. In accordance with Wisconsin law, defendant's
employer paid her a subsistence allowance of fifty per cent of her accrued
wages and retained the other half pending disposition of the case. De-
" In Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), a Federal district
court, upon the authority of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, stopped
housing project construction in Bogalusa, Louisiana, on sites selected with regard
to the racial composition of either the surrounding neighborhood or of the
projects themselves.
1 Garnishment is an action that brings the defendant's property into legal
custody either to provide security for a claim that may be established in the
future or to satisfy a judgment already rendered for the plaintiff. Beggs v. Fite,
130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937). Attachment is a similar remedy but it
reaches property held by the defendant himself, while garnishment is appropriate
for reaching property of the defendant held by a third party. 6 Am. JuR. Attach-
inent and Garnishment § 3 (1963). A garnishment proceeding cannot stand alone,
but is ancillary to the principal action in which the validity of the plaintiff's claim
is determined. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.1 (1953).
'395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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